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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMIE MEDVED, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. 
C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D. AND ESTATE ; 
BLAYNE L. HIRSCHE, M.D. ; 
Defendants and Appellees. ] 
) CaseNo.20030338-CA 
) Trial Court No. 010400960 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2-2(f)(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues on appeal relate to the District Court's granting of Defendants9 Motion 
to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint: 
1. Is the loss of Plaintiff s breast due to Defendants' negligent failure to 
diagnose cancer, a legally cognizable injury? 
2. Is the loss of a breast an actual injury under Utah law? 
3. Does a Plaintiff who has had more extensive surgery as a result of 
Defendants' negligence have to wait until she has a recurrence of cancer to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted? 
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4. Did the District Court error in dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint because she 
lost her breasts, but did not have a recurrence of cancer? 
On review of a grant of a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint under 12(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Complaint is entitled to the benefit of not only all 
allegations of the Complaint, but also from the inferences in the light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff. Ellis v. Social Service of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 615 
P.2d 1250 (Ut. 1980); Mountaineer v. Utah Power & Light 823 P.2d 1055 (Ut. 1991). 
The allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint are deemed to be true. Brown v. Weis 871 P.2d 
552 (Ut. 1994). 
Disposition In Lower Court 
1. On November 20, 2002, oral arguments were heard on Defendants' Joint 
Motion for Dismissal Without Prejudice. 
2. On November 26, 2002, the Court was advised that Blayne Hirsche, M.D. 
had died in a plane accident. On December 10, 2002, pursuant to Stipulation, the Estate 
of Blayne Hirsche was substituted as a party Defendant. 
3. On March 19, 2003, the Court granted Defendants' Joint Motion. 
4. Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal on April 8, 2003. 
5. Plaintiffs Docketing Statement was filed on April 28, 2003. 
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DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
The interpretation of the following statutes and case law are involved in this 
appeal: 
1. George v. LDS Hospital, 797 2d 1117 (Ut App. 1990) 
2. Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Ut. 1996) 
3. Restatement of Torts, §323. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On December 28, 1998, Plaintiff underwent a right radical mastectomy as a 
result of Defendants9 negligent failure to timely diagnose breast cancer. Plaintiff later 
had chemotherapy and radiation as well as a surgical reconstruction of her breast. 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants' negligence, her diagnosis was 
delayed resulting in her having a mastectomy, intensive chemo and radiation therapies 
and subsequent reconstruction of her breast. Plaintiff also remains at an unnecessarily 
high risk of recurrence. Plaintiff alleged that had the diagnosis been made timely, she 
would not have had the extensive surgery and resulting reconstruction of her breast. 
B. Statement of Facts 
The following facts are admitted by the parties or not in material dispute: 
1. Plaintiff first saw Dr. Glenn as a patient in 1991. 
2. Plaintiffs last visit with Dr. Glenn was February 27, 1998. 
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3. During the time Plaintiff was Dr. Glenn's patient, she was diagnosed with 
fibrocystic breast disease. 
4. Plaintiff first saw Dr. Hirsche as a patient on July 13, 1998. 
5. A mammogram, ordered by Dr. Hirsche and performed on July 20, 1998, 
revealed dense fibroglandular tissue bilaterally. 
6. On August 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed bilateral breast augmentation 
and aspiration of three suspected right breast cysts. 
7. On December 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed an excisional biopsy of 
three right breast nodules. 
8. The pathological examination associated with the December 12, 1998, 
excisional biopsy revealed the presence of differentiated infiltrating ductal carcinoma. 
9. On December 28, 1998, Steven J. Mintz, M.D. performed a right modified 
radical mastectomy. 
10. Plaintiff followed her surgical treatment with chemotherapy and radiation 
therapy and later had surgical reconstruction. 
11. Plaintiff has not had a recurrence of her cancer. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court failed to follow Utah law and incorrectly granted Defendants' 
Joint Motion to Dismiss. 
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Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Defendants negligently delayed diagnosis of her 
cancer and, as a result, Plaintiff (a) sustained actual damages by undergoing more 
extensive treatment and surgery, including a radical mastectomy and (b) has an increased 
risk of recurrence. 
Utah has recognized that liability may be imposed where negligence increases a 
party's risk of harm in George v. IDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990). In 
Seale v. Gowans 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), that right was limited to cases where the 
increased risk of harm is accompanied by actual damages. 
Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint, (which under a motion to dismiss are deemed to 
be true), that she sustained actual damages as well as an increased risk of recurrence. 
Plaintiff has, therefore, stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS9 MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS PLED THAT AS A RESULT OF 
DEFENDANTS' DELAY IN DIAGNOSIS, SHE SUSTAINED 
ACTUAL DAMAGES AND HAS AN INCREASED RISK OF 
CANCER RECURRENCE. 
A. In A Motion To Dismiss, All Of Plaintiff s Allegations In Her 
Complaint Are Deemed To Be True. 
On a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint under 12(b)(6), of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Complaint is entitled to the benefit of not only all allegations in the 
Complaint, but also from the inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Ellis v. 
5 
Social Services of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 
1980), Mountaineer v. Utah Power & Light Co. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). The 
allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint are deemed to be true. Brown v Weis 871 P.2d 552 
(Utah 1994). 
B. Plaintiff Has Pled That She Sustained Actual 
Damages And Has An Increased Risk of 
Recurrence of Cancer As A Result of Defendants' 
Delay In Diagnosis. 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants' delay in diagnosis that 
she sustained actual damages as a result of the Defendants' negligence: 
13. On December 16, 19985 the biopsies were carried out 
by Dr. Hirsche. These revealed infiltrating ductile carcinoma 
at all three sites. In late December of 1998, Ms. Medved 
underwent a right mastectomy. Since the tumor involved 
eight lymph nodes, it was also necessary to have the lymph 
nodes removed. She also underwent chemotherapy and 
radiation therapy after the surgery. 
* * # 
17. As a proximate result of the above-described 
negligence of Dr. Glenn, Jamie Medved's diagnosis of her 
breast cancer was delayed resulting in her having to undergo 
a mastectomy and axillary node dissection, intensive 
chemotherapy and radiation therapy and she remains at a very 
high risk of recurrence, has endured pain and suffering, 
disfigurement loss of enjoyment of life and, other general 
damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
18. As a proximate result of the above-described 
negligence of Dr. Glenn, Plaintiff has incurred medical 
expenses, and, will undoubtedly incur future medical 
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expenses and, other special damages including, but not 
limited to loss of income and loss of economic opportunities, 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
Since the allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint are deemed to be true, the issue is 
whether the Defendants5 failure to timely diagnose breast cancer which results in a right 
radical mastectomy and produces an increased risk of the recurrence of cancer, states a 
claim for relief under Utah law. 
C. Actual Damages In Conjunction With An Increased 
Risk of Cancer Recurrence Is Sufficient To Sustain 
A Claim For Negligence, 
In addition to actual damages, (radical mastectomy), Plaintiff has alleged that she 
has an increased risk of recurrence of cancer. In George v. IDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 
(Utah App. 1990), the court recognized a claim for loss of chance. It cited with approval 
James v. United States 483 F.Supp. 581, 585 (N.D.C.A. 1980): 
"Evidence which shows a reasonable certainty that negligent 
delay in diagnosis or treatment increased or lessened the 
effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to establish proximate 
cause." Id. at 585. 
The Court also approved Hicks v. United States 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966) and 
its conclusion that Defendant's "negligence nullified whatever chance of recovery she 
might have had and was the proximate cause of the death." Id. at 633. The court in 
George, supra, similarly cited with approval Goffv. Doctors General Hospital of San 
Jose 333 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1958) (where the "chance of saving a patient's life would have 
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been increased if a physician had been timely notified" and whether this negligence was a 
cause of death was a jury question.) Hamilv. Bashline 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978) and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323' 
In George, the Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against the hospital. 
Following a jury verdict in favor of the hospital, the Supreme Court reversed for new 
trial. The Court found that a jury could have reasonably concluded that the hospital's 
negligence prevented doctors from treating and possibly saving patients' life but that the 
jury instructions prevented it from meaningfully considering the expert testimony. 
Under George v. LDS Hospital, supra., then, a party is subject to liability if his 
negligent conduct increases the risk of harm, lessens the effectiveness of treatment or 
decreases a chance of survival. Id. at 1117. 
In Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court 
conditioned that right of recovery to cases where the Plaintiff presents proof of actual 
damages. It did not abolish the claim for enhanced risk or overturn the ruling in George 
v. LDS Hospital, supra. In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants cite, the following 
language from Seale: ...[A]n alleged claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a 
cause of action for negligence." (Defendants' Memorandum in Support at p.4.) The 
complete quotation is, in fact: 
'"One who undertakes... to render services to another...is subject to liability... if (a) his 
failure to exercise [reasonable] care increases the risk of such harm." 
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Although we agree that the cancers spread resulted in a 
dramatic decrease in Ms. Seale's chance of survival, we 
concluded that without proof of actual damages, an alleged 
claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a cause of 
action for negligence. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court in Seale discussed Colbert v. Georgetown Univ. 641 A.2d 469 (D.C. 
1994), and Swain v. Curry 595 So.2d 168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1992), where risk of recurrence 
of cancer was approved, as a basis of liability. The Utah Supreme Court found that: 
In these cases [Colbert and Swain] the evidence 
showed that the Plaintiffs had suffered actual damages in 
conjunction with the increased risk of the cancers recurrence." 
Id. at 1366. 
The Court distinguished those cases from Ms. Seale's who did not allege she had 
actual damages as a result of the delay in diagnosis. Seale had a mastectomy and more 
extensive surgery in 1988, but did not sue until 1991. She did not allege the 1988 actual 
damages (mastectomy) in her 1991 suit because she was barred by the statute of 
limitations from such assertion. She, therefore, sued only for the risk of recurrence of 
cancer. 
The issue in Seale was whether that claim was barred by the statute of limitations, 
Ms. Seale went to Dr. Gowans for a mammogram in August 1987. Dr. Gowans failed to 
detect a cancerous mass in Ms. Seale's breast. The mass was not discovered until May, 
1988. Ms. Seale had a radical mastectomy a short time later. The pathology report of the 
removed tissue showed that the cancer had spread to eight of Ms. Seale's twenty lymph 
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nodes. Although Ms. Seale was told that the finding of cancer in her lymph nodes 
increases the possibility that cancer would recur in other parts of her body, Ms. Seale did 
not bring an action against Dr. Gowans at that time. 
Ms. Seale tested negative for cancer until August 1991, when a bone scan showed 
cancer in her hip. Ms. Seale then brought an action against Dr. Gowans for negligent 
delay in diagnosing her cancer. Based on the jury's finding that Ms. Seale discovered or 
should have discovered her injury in June 1988, when she was correctly diagnosed with 
breast cancer, the trial court held that Ms. Seale's action was barred by the medical 
malpractice act's two-year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the particular facts of the case, the statute of 
limitations did not begin to run until the cancer returned in Ms. Seale's hip. 
Dr. Gowans argued that the injury that triggered the running of the statute of 
limitations was the cancer's spread to Ms. Seale's lymph nodes, "which statistically 
increased the chance that cancer would recur and thus decreased her chance of long-term 
survival." 923 P.2d at 1364 (footnote omitted). The court held that "damages in the form 
of an enhanced risk only are not sufficient to start the running of the statute of 
limitations." Id, at 1365 (emphasis added). The court noted the general rule that, until a 
plaintiff suffers "actual harm or damages, the limitations period will not accrue." Id. at 
1364. The court emphasized that the defendant had the burden of proving that the 
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plaintiff had suffered some "actual harm or damages" before August 1989 and concluded 
that the defendant had not met his burden: 
[Defendants failed to prove that Ms. Seale suffered a legally 
cognizable injury when she discovered that the cancer had 
spread to her lymph nodes. The only evidence that 
defendants produced regarding the harmful consequence of 
the cancer's spread was that it increased the risk that the 
cancer would recur. They failed to argue or produce evidence 
that in 1988, Ms, Seale could complain of any actual present 
damages. Although we agree that the cancer's spread resulted 
in a dramatic decrease in Ms. Seale's chance of survival, we 
conclude that without proof of actual damages, an alleged 
claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a cause of 
action for negligence. ... 
Because the only evidence defendants presented at trial, and 
the only evidence Ms. Seale could marshal, showed that Ms. 
Seale could not have discovered any legally cognizable injury 
until 1991, we find that the evidence was insufficient for a 
jury to find that Ms. Seale discovered her injury in 1988. 
Id. at 1364-65, 1366 (emphasis added). 
In other words, the holding in Seale was based upon the parties' arguments and the 
evidence at trial that the only injury Ms. Seale suffered as a result of Dr. Gowans' 
negligence before her cancer recurred in 1991 was the possibility that her cancer would 
recur. The court found this a legally insufficient injury, absent some "actual harm or 
damages." See Id. at 1364. See also Id. ("once some harm is manifest, the limitations 
period begins to run on all claims") (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
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The Court did not rule or hold that Ms. Seale could not have sued in 1988 for 
actual damages or that she could not recover for enhanced risk or loss of chance. The 
Court only held that without actual damages, which were not alleged or sought, she could 
not have filed suit in 1988 for loss of chance. 
By contrast, Mrs. Medved has alleged "actual harm or damages" resulting from 
Defendants5 negligence, as well as the enhanced risk that her cancer will recur. As 
previously discussed, those allegations are assumed to be true in a Motion to Dismiss. 
Specifically, Mrs. Medved has alleged that, but for Defendants5 negligence, she would 
not have required a modified radical mastectomy, and she would not have undergone the 
cost of more extensive therapy, which caused her pain, suffering and inconvenience. 
II. TO THE EXTENT DEFENDANTS' MOTION IS DEEMED A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT SHOULD ALSO HAVE 
BEEN DENIED. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the undisputed material facts 
demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Territorial 
Sav. & Loan v. Baird 781 P.2d 452 (Utah 1989.) Even if the District Court found that 
under Seale v. Gowans Plaintiff cannot recover for loss of chance (increased risk of 
cancer), the Court could not have ruled that Plaintiff is barred from recovery for the actual 
damages she has already sustained. If Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is considered a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, (i.e., that as a matter of law, Plaintiff is not entitled to 
relief for her claim,) it should also be denied. 
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As a matter of law. Plaintiff has made a claim for relief which is legally 
cognizable. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants' delay in 
diagnosis, she underwent more extensive surgery and treatment and has an increased risk 
of recurrence of cancer. 
As discussed above, a Plaintiff who alleges she has sustained actual damages in 
conjunction with an increased risk of recurrence of cancer, has made a legally cognizable 
claim under Utah law. George v. LDSHospital, supra., and Seale v. Gowans, supra. As 
a matter of law, Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted and, thus, is 
entitled to relief for that claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that she sustained actual damages as a result of 
Defendants' delay in diagnosing her cancer. She is, therefore, entitled to all damages she 
has sustained, including all foreseeable consequences and those within reasonable 
medical certainty, caused by Defendants' negligence. Under Utah law, those 
consequences include the increased risk of harm caused by Defendants. 
Dated this ( 3 day of November, 2003. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN rv 
J^m^AV. Uilson / / 
/Attorneys for Plamtiff/Appellant, Jamie 
j Medved / 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAIME MEDVED, ] 
Plaintiff, ) 
C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D. AND BLAYNE ] 
L. fflRSCHE, M.D. ] 
Defendant. 
> COMPLAINT 
i (Demand for Jury Trial) 
I Civil No. 6l0*te%}0 
I Judge: ^ 
Plaintiff, Jaime Medved, by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby complains of 
the Defendants C. Joseph Glenn, M.D. and Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D., and for cause of action 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. For all causes of action hereinafter stated, Plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of this 






2. Defendant, C. Joseph Glenn, M.D., is a resident of Utah County, with his 
principal place of business in Utah County, state of Utah. The venue of this Court is therefore 
proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7 (1953, as amended). 
3. Defendant, Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D., is a resident of Utah County, with his 
principal place of business in Utah County, state of Utah. The venue of this Court is therefore 
proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7 (1953, as amended). 
4. Plaintiff, Jaime Medved, is a resident of Utah County, state of Utah. 
5. Plaintiff has complied with all required conditions precedent with respect to the 
service of a Notice of Intent to Commence Action and with respect to participation in a Panel 
Review of alleged medical malpractice involving the Defendants, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-14-1, et seq. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to bring this action. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
6. The Plaintiff, Jaime Medved, had been seeing Dr. Glenn as her OB/Gyn 
physician. In August of 1997, she saw Dr. Glenn complaining of a lump in her right breast. Dr. 
Glenn noted that she had a 2 millimeter superficial lump in her right breast along with fibrocystic 
changes of both breasts. He told the patient to check herself and to follow-up if she determined 
that the tumor had changed. 
7. Based upon Dr. Glenn's reassurance, Ms. Medved did not return to see him until 
February 27,1998. Dr. Glenn noted fibrocystic changes, asymmetrical, right much greater than 
left and tender. He indicated that he would refer Ms. Medved to Dr. Fullmer, if the lump did not 
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go down following her next menstrual cycle, but he failed to schedule any follow-up and failed to 
order a mammogram. 
8. On July 13,1998, Ms. Medved saw Dr. Blayne Hirsche, a plastic surgeon, to have 
the lumps removed and also to ask him about breast augmentation. Dr. Hirsche identified 
"numerous cysts" of the right breast. Dr. Hirsche recommended a mammogram and then 
proceeded with breast augmentation and aspiration of the cysts at the time of surgery. 
9. On July 20,1998, Ms. Medved obtained a mammogram and the report noted 
dense fibroglandular breast tissue bilaterally. The report further stated that there was no evidence 
of malignancy, however, the breast is heterogeneously dense. This may lower sensitivity of 
mammography. 
10. Dr. Hirsche performed surgery on August 12,1998 for breast augmentation. 
During that surgery, he used an 18 gauge needle to aspirate the three cystic areas. He noted that 
all three were aspirated with only a small amount of fluid being obtained. The areas appeared to 
be solid. No biopsy was done nor was the fluid sent for pathology. 
11. In a post-operative visit on August 14,1998, Dr. Hirsche discussed with Ms. 
Medved the need to have the breast lesions removed and that the procedure could be set up in 
approximately four to five weeks. 
12. On September 18,1998, Dr. Hirsche again saw Ms. Medved and noted that the 
cysts in the right breast were decreasing in size but were still tender, sore and enlarged. He 
recommended evaluating them again in three months. On December 14,1998, Dr. Hirsche 
examined Ms. Medved and recommended excisional biopsy of the breast lesions. 
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13. On December 16, 1998, the biopsies were carried out by Dr. Hirsche. These 
revealed infiltrating ductile carcinoma at all three sites. In late December of 1998, Ms. Medved 
underwent a right mastectomy. Since the tumor involved eight lymph nodes, it was also 
necessary to have the lymph nodes removed. She also underwent chemotherapy and radiation 
therapy after the surgery. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D.) 
14. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein, the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 13, above. 
15. The Defendant, Dr. Glenn, owed a duty of care to Jaime Medved which required 
him to act reasonably and in a careful and prudent manner in providing medical care and 
attention to Ms. Medved. 
16. The Defendant, Dr. Glenn, was negligent and breached his duty of care to Jaime 
Medved. Dr. Glenn's negligence includes, but is not limited to the following acts and/or 
omissions: 
a) Defendant, Dr. Glenn, evaluated Jaime Medved, noted that she had lumps 
in her breast, but failed to have her follow-up appropriately with him for further screening; 
b) Defendant, Dr. Glenn, failed to obtain a mammogram; 
c) Defendant, Dr. Glenn, negligently recommended that the patient herself 
determine whether the lumps were enlarging or not; 
d) Any other negligent acts or omissions which discovery may reveal. 
4 
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17. As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of Dr. Glenn, Jaime 
Medved's diagnosis of her breast cancer was delayed resulting in her having to undergo a 
mastectomy and axillary node dissection, intensive chemotherapy and radiation therapy and she 
remains at a very high risk of recurrence, has endured pain and suffering, disfigurement, loss of 
enjoyment of life and, other general damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
18. As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of Dr. Glenn, Plaintiff 
has incurred medical expenses, and, will undoubtedly incur future medical expenses and, other 
special damages including, but not limited to loss of income and loss of economic opportunities, 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT, BLAYNE L. HIRSCHE, M.D.) 
19. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein the allegations of 1 through 13, above. 
20. The Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, owed a duty of care to Jaime Medved which required 
him to act reasonably and in a careful and prudent manner in providing medical care and 
attention to Jaime Medved. 
21. The Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, was negligent and breached his duty of care to Jaime 
Medved. Dr. Hirsche's negligence includes, but is not limited to, the following acts and 
omissions: 
a) Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, failed to remove the breast tumors at the time he 
did surgery and when he discovered that he was dealing with a solid mass and not a cyst; 
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b) Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, negligently went ahead with the breast 
augmentation surgery which further delayed diagnosis of cancer; 
c) Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, misdiagnosed Ms. Medved's serious condition; 
d) Defendant, Dr. Hirsche, failed to provide adequate diagnostic tests and 
follow-up treatment; and 
e) Any other negligent acts or omissions which discovery may reveal. 
22. As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of Dr. Hirsche, Jaime 
Medved's diagnosis of her breast cancer was delayed resulting in her having to undergo a 
mastectomy and axillary node dissection, intensive chemotherapy and radiation therapy and she 
remains at a very high risk of recurrence, has endured pain and suffering, disfigurement, loss of 
enjoyment of life and, other general damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
23. As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of Dr. Glenn. Plaintiff 
has incurred medical expenses, and, will undoubtedly incur future medical expenses and, other 
special damages including, but not limited to loss of income and loss of economic opportunities, 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief against the Defendants, and each of them, as 
follows: 
A, For general damages, including but not limited to damages for pain and suffering, 
loss of enjoyment of life in amounts as may be proven at trial; 
B. For medical expenses both past and future in an amount to be proven at trial; 
6 
C. For lost wages and economic opportunities in an amount to be proven at trial; 
D. For costs and expenses incurred in this proceeding; and 
E. For interest on all special damages and for other such and further relief as this 
Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances. 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff requests a triakby jury and has enclosed the statutory fee herewith. 
DATED this 2 $ day of February, 2001. 
MICHAEL F. RICHMAN & ASSOCIATES 
Plaintiffs Address: 
490 South 1100 West 
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Dennis C. Ferguson [A1061] 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
Fax: (801)364-4500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D. 
Curtis J. Drake [A0910] 
Anne D. Armstrong [A8886] 
SNELL & WILMER, LLP 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant 
C. Joseph Glenn, M.D. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D., and BLAYNE 
L. HIRSCHE, M.D., 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION 
FOR DISMISSAL 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
Case No. 010400960 
Division 9 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Defendants Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D. ("Dr. Hirsche") and C. Joseph Glenn, M.D. ("Dr. 
Glenn") (collectively "Defendants"), hereby move the Court for an order dismissing without 
prejudice plaintiffs Complaint and legal action. The basis for this motion is that plaintiffs legal 
SMITHMS\SLC\216787.3 
action, if she ever has one, has not accrued under the legal doctrine established in Seale v. 
Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996). 
Plaintiffs complaint against Defendants includes allegations of negligence in failing to 
timely diagnose her breast cancer. Plaintiff further alleges that, as a result of the alleged delay in 
diagnosis, the likelihood of a recurrence is greater and her prognosis is therefore worse than 
would have been the case with an earlier diagnosis. Under the holding of Seale, supra, however, 
unless there is a recurrence of cancer, no legally cognizable injury exists and no cause of action 
has arisen. Plaintiff has not suffered a recurrence of cancer. Plaintiffs cause of action 
therefore, has not accrued and the Complaint should be dismissed. This motion is supported by a 
legal memorandum submitted contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this %Q day of TAJLIU , 2002. Au , 
LIAMS & HUNT 
I IAAJ 
Denllis C. Ferguson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D. 
SNELL & WlLMER 
Curtis J. Drake 
Anne D. Armstrong 
Attorneys for Defendant 
C. Joseph Glenn, M.D. 
SMITHMS\SLC\216787.3 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, first-class, 
postage prepaid, on the j ? 0 daY of _ ^ k = l _ > 2 0 0 2 1 0 m e following: 
*f 
Michael F. Richman, Esq. 
James W. Gilson, Esq. 
MICHAEL F. RICHMAN & ASSOCIATES 
5664 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 




Michael F. Richman [#4180] 
James W.Gilson [#1170] 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5664 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 266-0999 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMIE MEDVED, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
C.JOSEPH GLENN, MJ). AND BLAYNE j 
L. HIRSCHE, M.D. ; 
Defendants. 
1 PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
) DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTICtf 
) FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT 
> PREJUDICE 
) Case No.: 010400960 
i Division: 9 
i Judge: Fred D. Howard 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff, Jamie Medved by and through her counsel of record, hereby submit the 
following in response and opposition to Defendants' Joint Motion for Dismissal Without 
Prejudice. 
Defendants' motion should be denied because Plaintiff has pled that she sustained actual 
damages as a result of Defendants' failure to timely diagnose her cancer. Specifically, plaintiffs 
Complaint alleges actual damages in conjunction with an increased risk of recurrence of cancer. 
She has, therefore, stated a doim upon winch tvlic/f ran he granted under I hull \i\\\ flporge v. 
1 
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LDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990) ("Liability may be found where negligence 
increases a party's risk of harm.") Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323) Seale v. Gowans 923 
P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996) ("Actual damages in conjunction with the cancer's recurrence" is a 
cognizable claim.) 
DEFENDANTS* MOTION TO DTSMTSS 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Defendant's negligently delayed diagnosis of her cancer 
and as a result, Plaintiff (a) sustained actual damages by undergoing more extensive treatment 
and surgery, including a radical mastectomy and (b) has an increased risk of recurrence. 
Defendants' move to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint on the grounds that unless there is a 
recurrence of cancer, Plaintiff has not sustained a legally cognizable injury. Since Plaintiff has 
not had a recurrence, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed, 
(Defendants' Memorandum in Support Of Motion to Dismiss at p.2.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION 
Utah has recognized that liability may be imposed where negligence increases a party's 
risk of harm in George v. LDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990). In Seale v. Gowans 
923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), that right was limited to cases where the increased risk of harm is 
accompanied by actual damages. 
Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint, (which under a motion to dismiss are deemed to be 
true), that she sustained actual damages as well as an increased risk of recurrence. Plaintiff has 
therefore stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
2 
I. DEFEND ANTS* MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF HAS PLED THAT AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANTS5 DELAY IN 
DIAGNOSIS, SHE SUSTAINED ACTUAL DAMAGES AND HAS AN 
INCREASED RISK OF CANCER RECURRENCE. 
A. In A Motion To Dismiss, All Of Plaintiff s Allegations In Her Complaint Are 
Deemed To Be True. On a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint under 12(b)(6), of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Complaint is entitled to the benefit of not only al 1 allegations in the 
Complaint, but also from the inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Ellis v. Social 
Services of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints 615 P. 2d 1250 (I Jtah 1980), Mounteer 
v. Utah Power & Light Co. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). The allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint 
are deemed to be true. Brown v. Weis 871 P.2d 552 (Utah 1994). 
Plaintiff Has Pled That She Sustained Actual Damages And Has An 
Increased Risk of Recurrence of Cancer As A Result of Defendants' Delay In Diagnosis. 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants' delay in diagnosis that: 
13. On December 16,1998, the biopsies were carried out by 
Dr. Hirsche. These revealed infiltrating ductile carcinoma at all 
three sites. In late December of 1998. Ms. Medved underwent a 
right mastectomy. Since the tumor involved eight lymph nodes, it 
was also necessary to have the lymph nodes removed. She also 
underwent chemotherapy and radiation therapy after the surgery. 
t * # 
17. As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of 
Dr. Glenn, Jamie Medved5 s diagnosis of her breast cancer was 
delayed resulting in her having to undergo a mastectomy and 
axillary node dissection, intensive chemotherapy and radiation 
therapy and she remains at a very high risk of recurrence, has 
endured pain and suffering, disfigurement loss of enjoyment of life 
and, other general damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
3 
18. As a proximate result of the above-described negligence of 
Dr. Glenn, Plaintiff has incurred medical expenses, and, will 
undoubtedly incur future medical expenses and, other special 
damages including, but not limited to loss of income and loss of 
economic opportunities, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
See also, paragraphs 22 and 23. 
Defendants' statement of facts in their motion are unsupported by affidavit or deposition 
and should be stricken. The only "facts" before the court on this motion are the allegations of 
Plaintiffs Complaint which are assumed to be true and are entitled to all reasonable inferences to 
the benefit of the Plaintiff. The sole issue is whether those allegations, assumed to be true, state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Since the allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint are deemed to be true, the issue is whether 
the Defendants' failure to timely diagnose breast cancer which results in a right radical 
mastectomy and produces an increased risk of the recurrence of cancer, states a claim for relief 
under Utah law. 
C. Actual Damages In Conjunction With An Increased Risk of Cancer 
Recurrence Is Sufficient To Sustain A Claim For Negligence. In addition to actual damages, 
(radical mastectomy), Plaintiff has alleged that she has an increased risk of recurrence of cancer. 
In George v. LDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990), the court recognized a claim for 
loss of chance. It cited with approval James v. United States 483 F.Supp. 581, 585 (N.D.C.A. 
1980): 
"Evidence which shows a reasonable certainty that negligent delay 
in diagnosis or treatment increased or lessened the effectiveness of 
treatment is sufficient to establish proximate cause." Id. at 585. 
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The Court also approved Hicks v. United States 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966) and its 
conclusion that Defendant's "negligence nullified w hatever chance of recovery she might have 
had and was the proximate cause of the death." Id. at 633, The court in George, supra, similarly 
cited with approval Goffv. Doctors General Hospital of San Jose 333 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1958) 
(where the "chance of saving a patient's life woi ilci have been increased if a physician had been 
timely notified" and whether this negligence was a cause of death was a jury question.) Hamil v. 
Bashline 392 A.2d 1280 (P. 1978) and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 3231 
In George, the Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against the hospital. Following 
a jury verdict in favor of the hospital, the Supreme Court reversed for new trial. The Court found 
that a jury could have reasonably concluded that the hospital' s negligence prevented doctors 
from treating and possibly saving patients' life but that the jury instructions prevented it from 
meaningfully considering the expert testimony. 
Under George v. LDS II^^HUL. W . • .*. • I^IMC to liability if his negligent 
conduct increases the risk of harm, lessens the effectiveness of treatment or decreases a chance of 
survival. Id. at 1117. 
hiSeale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court conditioned 
that right of recovery to cases where the Plaintiff presents proof of actual damages. It did not 
abolish (he* claim lor enhanced nsk or OUTIIU'II flic nilin<> in - icorgc v LPS Hospital, supra, 
Defendants cite, out of context, the following language from Seale: ...[A]n alleged claim for 
lffOne who undertakes...to render services to another...is subject to liability...if (a) his 
failure to exercise [reasonable] care increases the risk of such harm." 
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enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a cause of action for negligence." (Defendants* 
Memorandum in Support at p.4.) The complete quotation is, in fact: 
Although we agree that the cancers spread resulted in a dramatic 
decrease in Ms. Seale's chance of survival, we concluded that 
without proof of actual damages, an alleged claim for enhanced 
risk is not adequate to sustain a cause of action for negligence. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Court discussed Colbert v. Georgetown Univ. 641 A.2d 469 (D.C. 1994), and Swain 
v. Curry 595 So.2d 168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1992), where risk of recurrence of cancer was approved, 
as a basis of liability. The Utah Supreme Court found that: 
In these cases [Colbert and Swain] the evidence showed 
that the Plaintiffs had suffered actual damages in conjunction with 
the increased risk of the cancers recurrence." Id. at 1366. 
The Court distinguished those cases from Ms. Seale's who did not allege she had actual 
damages as a result of the delay in diagnosis. Seale had a mastectomy and more extensive 
surgery in 1988, but did not sue until 1991. She did not allege the 1988 actual damages 
(mastectomy) in her 1991 suit because she was barred by the statute of limitations from such 
assertion. She, therefore, sued only for the risk of recurrence of cancer. 
The issue in Seale was whether that claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Ms. 
Seale went to Dr. Gowans for a mammogram in August 1987. Dr. Go wans failed to detect a 
cancerous mass in Ms. Seale's breast. The mass was not discovered until May, 1988. Ms. Seale 
had a radical mastectomy a short time later. The pathology report of the removed tissue showed 
that the cancer had spread to eight of Ms. Seale's twenty lymph nodes. Although Ms. Seale was 
told that the finding of cancer in her lymph nodes increases the possibility that cancer wrould 
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recur in other parts of her body, Ms. Seale did not bring an action against Dr. Gowans at that 
time. 
Ms. Seale tested negative for cancer i iiiti Il < \ i igust 1991, when a bone scan showed cancer 
in her hip. Ms. Seale then brought an action against Dr. Gowans for negligent delay in 
diagnosing her cancer. Based on the jury's finding that Ms. Seale discovered or should have 
discovered her injury in June 1988, when she was correctly diagnosed with breast cancer, the 
trial court held that Ms. Scale's action was barred by the medical malpractice act's two-year 
statute of limitations, I Jtah Code \ nil, § 78 1 :1 4 Ilie I Jtah Supreme Court: reversed, holding 
that, under the particular facts of the case, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the 
cancer returned in Ms. Seale's hip. 
Gowans argued that the i nji lry that triggered the i: i in ning of the statute of limitations 
was the cancer's spread to Ms. Seale's lymph nodes, "which statistically increased the chance 
that cancer would recur and thus decreased her chance of long-term survival." 923 P,2d at 1364 
(footnote omitted). The court held that "damages in the form of an enhanced risk only are not 
sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations." Id at 1365 (emphasis added). The 
court * u->r the general rule that, i: intil a plaintiff suffers "actual harm • 3r damages, the limitations 
period will not accrue." Id at 1364. The court emphasized that the defendant had the burden of 
proving that the plaintiff had suffered some "actual harm or damages" before August 1989 and 
concluded that the defendant had not met his burden: 
[Defendants failed to prove that Ms. Seale suffered a legally 
cognizable injury when she discovered that the cancer had spread 
to her lymph nodes. The only evidence that defendants produced 
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regarding the harmful consequence of the cancer's spread was that 
it increased the risk that the cancer would recur. They failed to 
argue or produce evidence that in 1988, Ms. Seale could complain 
of any actual present damages. Although we agree that the 
cancer's spread resulted in a dramatic decrease in Ms. Seale's 
chance of survival, we conclude that without proof of actual 
damages, an alleged claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to 
sustain a cause of action for negligence,... 
Because the only evidence defendants presented at trial, and the 
only evidence Ms. Seale could marshal, showed that Ms. Seale 
could not have discovered any legally cognizable injury until 1991, 
we find that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find that 
Ms. Seale discovered her injury in 1988. 
Id. at 1364-65, 1366 (emphasis added). 
In other words, the holding in Seale was based upon the parties' arguments and the 
evidence at trial that the only injury Ms. Seale suffered as a result of Dr. Gowans' negligence 
before her cancer recurred in 1991 was the possibility that her cancer would recur. The court 
found this a legally insufficient injury, absent some "actual harm or damages." See Id. at 1364. 
See also Id. ("once some harm is manifest, the limitations period begins to run on all claims") 
(emphasis added and citation omitted). 
The Court did not rule or hold that Ms. Seale could not have sued in 1988 for actual 
damages or that she could not recover for enhanced risk or loss of chance. The Court only held 
that without actual damages, which were not alleged or sought, she could not have filed suit in 
1988 for loss of chance. 
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By contrast, Mrs. Medved has alleged "actual harm or damages" resulting from 
Defendants' negligence, as well as the enhanced risk that her cancer will recur. As previously 
discussed, those J -£a\v :.- r\ . -. J • • • : > n ^ ^eciiiea* 
Medved has alleged that, but for Defendants' negligence, she would not have required a modified 
radical mastectomy, and she would not have undergone the cost of more extensive therapy, 
which caused her pain, suffering and inconvenience. 
TO THE EXTENT DEFENDANTS' MOTION IS DEEMED A MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT SHOULD ALSO BE DENIED. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the undisputed material facts demonstrate that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Territorial Sav, & Loan v. Baird 781 
P.2d 452 (Utah 1989,) Since Defendants have not offered any affidavits, depositions, 
interrogatories or admissions, the pleadings are the only thing before the court. If Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss is considered a Motion for Summary Judgment, (i.e., that as a matter of law, 
Plaintiff is not entitled to relief for her claim,) it should also be denied, 
As a matter of law. Plaintiff has made a claim for relief which is legally cognizable. 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that as a result of Defendants' delay in diagnosis, she underwent 
more extensive surgery and treatment and has an increased risk of recurrence of cancer. 
As discussed above, a Plaintiff who alleges she has sustained actual damages in 
under Utah law. George v. LDS Hospital, supra., and Seale v. Gowans, supra. As a matter of 
law, Plaintiff is entitled to relief for that claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that she sustained actual damages as a result of Defendants' 
delay in diagnosing her cancer. She is, therefore, entitled to all damages she has sustained, 
including all foreseeable consequences and those within reasonable medical certainty, caused by 
Defendants' negligence. Under Utah law, those consequences include the increased risk of harm 
caused by Defendants. 
Dated this 12~day of August, 2002. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
tiff, Jamie Medved 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Cindy Disraeli, hereby certify that I have thisy^_th day of August, 2002, served the 
foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION FOR 
DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE, to all interested parties to this matter by mailing a copy, 
regular mail, properly addressed and with postage prepaid, to: 
Counsel for Defendant; C. Joseph Glenn. M.D. 
Curtis J. Drake 
Snell & Wihner 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Counsel for Defendant: Blayne L. Hirsche. M.D. 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Cindy 1L. Disraeli 
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Exhibit D 
DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A1061) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Phone (801) 521-5678 
Fax (801) 364-4500 
CURTIS J, DRAKE 
SNELL&WILMER 
Attorneys for Defendant C. Joseph <31efin, M.D. 
15 W South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Phone (801) 257-1900 
Fax (801) 257-1800 
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C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D. 
HIRSCHE, M.D., 
Defendants. 
- : • L . 
JOINT REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
J.(/H ^ . , 1 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Defendants submit this Joint Reply Memorandi. ,s a Morion rn 
Dismiss Without Prejudice. Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs Complaint under the 
precedent established in Seale v. Gowahs, V2:i V.2d I ,\o \ \ I luh !'>%>, which holds that a 
plaintiff attempting to assert a claim for negligent delay in diagnosis of breast cancer does 
not have a cause of action unless or until she has a recurrence of cancer. In essence, Seale 
holds that a plaintiff cannot assert a claim that her potential for developing a recurrence of 
cancer is greater, or her chance of surviving reduced, because of a delay in diagnosis so 
long as she remains cancer free. Seale holds that such a cause of action does not accrue 
until such time, if ever, as the cancer recurs. 
There is no dispute in this case that plaintiff, despite her alleged delay in diagnosis, 
has not had a recurrence of cancer. In her opposition memorandum, plaintiff objects to 
the statement of facts set forth by defendants in their principal supporting memorandum 
and asserts that the Court must determine the merits of defendants5 motion based solely 
upon the allegations of the Complaint. She argues that she has alleged in her complaint 
that had her cancer been diagnosed sooner, she would have received different and less 
invasive treatment and that she has, therefore, suffered actual damages. The statement of 
facts presented by defendants in the principal memorandum, do not call into dispute this 
allegation. While defendants have reason to dispute this assertion, they do not purport to 
do so in the context of this motion nor do they believe that it is relevant to the legal issue 
presented to the Court. 
It also makes no difference whether this Court treats defendants' motion as a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or as a motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56. The Court is entitled to consider evidence outside of the pleadings, 
if appropriate, regardless of how defendants3 motion is styled. Rule 12(b)(6) makes 
specific allowance for the Coxirt to consider evidence and simply treat a motion to dismiss 
as a motion for summary judgment Frankly, the facts set forth in defendants5 
memorandum are so basic and so incontrovertible that defendants did not anticipate 
opposition to them. To ensure that the Court is able to place this case in proper context, 
-2-
however, it is important to understand the basic sequence of medical facts. Therefore, 
defendants reassert the eleven statements of feet set forth in their principal memorandum, 
with citations to the record. 
1. Plaintiff first saw Dr. Glenn as a patient in 1991. (l^iintiffs deposition, 
p. 20; see also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant tx> Bide 2<S(a)). 
2. HaintiPs last visit with Dr (Menn was February 27* 1908'. (Malrittffs 
depositions p. 112; see also, medical records produced by p(Iaintiff ^ to 
Rule 26(a)), 
3. During tiie time pldxiMff tvas a patient of I>^ Glenn, she was diag^osod \vih 
fibrocystic breast disease* (peposiioh of p l a in t pp. 20,90: see also, medical rec^txis 
pitodticed by p la j^ 
4. Plaintiff first saw IM iftrsche as a patient on July 13, 1998. (Plaintiffs 
dfepdsitioii, p. 40; see also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)). 
5. A mammogram, ordered by Dr. Hirsche and performed 1 
revealed dense fibroglandular tissue bilaterally, no significant abnormality and no evidence 
of miaMgnancy (£kintiffs deposition, p. 19; see also, medical records produced by 
plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)). 
6. On August 12> 1998* Bn Hirsche performed bilateral breast augmentation 
and aspiration of three siispected ri^ht breast cysts. (Maiiiiffs deposition, p. 43, see also, 
all medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)). 
001 fin 
7. On December 16, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed an excisional biopsy of 
three right breast nodules. (Deposition of plaintiff, p. 52; plaintiffs Complaint, H 13; see 
also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)), 
8. The pathological examination associated with the December 16,1998, 
excisional biopsy revealed the presence of differentiated infiltrating ductal carcinoma. 
(Plaintiffs deposition, p. 54; see also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to 
Rule 26(a)). 
9. On December 28, 1998, Steven J. Mintz, M.D. performed a right modified 
radial mastectomy. (Plaintiffs deposition, p. 57; see also, medical records produced by 
plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)). 
10* Plaintiff followed her surgical treatment with chemotherapy and radiation 
therapy and later had surgical reconstruction. (Plaintiffs deposition, pp. 57, 58, and 121; 
see also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)). 
11. Plaintiff has not had a recurrence of her cancer. (Plaintiffs deposition, 
pp. 60-61; see also, medical records produced by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS, 
UTAH LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A LOSS OF 
CHANCE CAUSE OF ACTION 
In opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff contends that because her claim 
includes actual, present damages in conjunction with claims for damages associated with an 
increased risk of recurrence of cancer, she has stated a cognizable claim under Utah law. 
In support of this argument, plaintiff cites George v. LPS Hospital. 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah 
-4-
Ct App, 1990) and asserts that the George court recognized a claim for loss of chance. 
VhiimS liext argues that the Utah Supreme Courts decision in Stale merely limited the 
holding in George by requMi^ that a loss of chance claim be accompanied by a claim for 
actual arid pifeseiit damages. Contrary to plaintiffs contention, George did not recognisje a 
claim for loss of chaMe. 
In George, a hospitalized patient died as a result of a sepsis-induced cardiac arrest. 
The factual evidence presented at trial showed that hospital nur* Te aware a 
patient's condition was deteriorating for a period of four hours prior to the cardiac arrest, 
but failed to inform the patient's physicians of these s»" TAVU :; f found 
that, although the nurses3 failure to inform the physicians constituted negligence, it was 
not a proximate cause of the patienfs deatl , .1. *; ^ n. :> * in if;' ,t- ucd r * iurv 
instructions improperly implied that there could only be one proximate cause of injury, 
thereby preventing the jury from finding ! ; tributing 
and proximate cause of the patient's death. The issue on appeal was one of negligence and 
jpxximat^ cause and whether a negligent act which ^ - :\ • ••* • injury biut is not 
the sole cause of mjury, constitutes proximate cause. The Utah Court of Appeals, finding 
that a jury could have reasonably concluded th: -ses5 failvn ify physicians of 
the patient*s deteriorating condition was a proximate cause of her death, reversed and 
remanded for a new"trial.- In its analysis, the George court found tlwt the facts presented 
at trial supported the plaintiflPs position that the nurses3 negligence was a contributing 
cause of the patienfs death. Inso doin^ tin MHIII rxplamcd ili.it., ii 1I111 nurses IILHI 
notified physicians of the patienfs symptoms, they may have taken measures to treat the 
sepsis before the patient arrested. Their fa i lure 'to act therefore, operated to reduce the 
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patient's chances for recovery It is this characterization of the mechanism of causation 
which is sometimes erroneously interpreted as establishing a loss of chance cause of action. 
In George however, reduced chance of recovery and increased risk of harm are descriptions 
of the contributing cause of injury not of the injury itself. The injury was deatli. Plaintiff 
here seeks to establish that a decreased chance of recovery is itself an injury The holding 
in George simply does not support plaintiffs argument. 
In Anderson v Brigham Young University, 879 fi Supp. 1124 (D. Utah 1995), the 
United States District Court had occasion to interpret George when it was presented in 
essentially the same manner as plaintiff attempts to use it here. Andersen, a diversity 
action, involved a medical malpractice claim brought by a BYU student against the BYU 
McDonald Health Center. The plaintiff alleged that physicians at die health center failed 
to timely diagnose his Hodgkitf Disease. He sought recovery for a reduced chance of 
survival and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finding that Utah law does not 
recognize a loss of chance cause of action, the court granted BYLPs motion for summary 
judgment on the claim for reduced chance for survival. In so doing the court addressed 
George, which was cited by Andersen, and explained that it does not recognize a cause of 
action for loss of chance. 
The [George] court cited Hicks and other loss of chance cases 
for the proposition that where the chances of saving a life 
would be increased absent negligence or malpractice, a jury 
could find such negligence or malpractice to be a proximate 
cause of subsequent injury or death. George is distinguishable 
from the facts in this case, however. In George, there was an 
actual injury suffered because the patient died. George does not 
purport to recognize or create a new cause of option for mere 
reduction of statistical chances fir survival 
Anderson, 879 E Supp. at 1129. (Emphasis added.) 
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Plaintiff here also seeks recovery for a reduced chance of survival. As the Andersen 
court explains however, the holding in George does not support such a claim. In George, 
language regarding increased risk of harm and reduced chance of recovery is used to 
describe a proximate cause of injury, not an injury in and of itself. While not binding on 
this Court, the Andersen opinion provides a well-reasoned explanation of the Utah Court 
of Appeals holding in George. In addition, Andersen provides an accurate description of 
the status of Utah law with respea to the loss of chance doctrine. "This Court is satisfied 
that Utah has not adopted a separate cause of action permitting recovery for the reduction 
of a statistical chance of long-term survival." Andersen 879 E Supp. at 1130. 
It is Seale and not George which, in circumstances almost identical to the instant 
case, addressed the issue of whether Utah law permits recovery for a reduced chance of 
survival. The Seale Court decided the issue by finding that Ms. Seale did not have an 
actionable claim until the recurrence of her disease. ccMs. Seale could not have discovered 
any legally cognizable injury until 1991 [when she was diagnosed with a recurrence of 
cancer].» Seale 923 P.2d at 1366. 
POINT n 
PIAENTTFF FAILS TO DISTINGUISH HER 
INJURIES FROM THOSE HELD TO BE LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT IN SEALE v, GOWANS. 
The only facts necessary for the Court's determination of defendants5 motion are (1) 
plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for alleged negligent delay in diagnosis of breast 
cancer; and (2) since her treatment for the cancer she has had no recurrence. These facts 
alone not only support, but mandate a motion to dismiss in favor of the defendants. The 
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question before the Court is purely a question of law turning on the interpretation of the 
Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996). 
The essence of Seale is that no claim can be brought for a delay or failure to 
diagnose cancer, until such time as the cancer recurs. It is that simple: 
As a result, even though there exists a possibility even a 
probability of future harm, it is not enough to sustain a claim, 
and a plaintiff must wait until some harm manifests itself. 
Seale, 923 E2d at 1364. 
[W]e find that defendants failed to prove that Ms. Seale 
suffered a legally cognizable injury when she discovered that 
the cancer had spread to her lymph nodes. 
& 
As discussed hereafter, if Ms Seale's cancer had not recurred, 
she could not have recovered for an enhanced risk of the 
cancer's recurrence. 
M. at 1366, n.2. 
Plaintiffs opposition to the Motion to Dismiss is entirely based on an unsuccessful 
attempt to distinguish this case from Seale v. Gowans. Plaintiff claims that her case is 
unlike Seale in that Mrs. Medved has suffered actual present damages in the form of more 
extensive surgery which would not have been necessary if the defendants had diagnosed 
her cancer earlier. 
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish this case from Seale is, however, without basis. In 
fact, Ms. Seale had similar "actual" damages when she received the correct diagnosis and 
subsequent treatment more than two years prior to commencement of her lawsuit. In 
May 1988, approximately one year after Dr. Gowans's alleged failure to detect the breast 
cancer, Ms. Seale obtained a correct diagnosis and underwent a radical mastectomy, 
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followed by radiation and hormone treatment. At the time of the surgery, it was also 
discovered that she had developed a second malignant tumor and the cancer had spread to 
eight of her lymph nodes. Seale, 923 P.2d at 1362. 
In the present case, Mrs. Medved also had positive lymph nodes by the time her 
cancer was diagnosed. In Seale, the Court noted evidence that ccwomen who have small 
tumors with no positive nodes have a long-term survival rate in excess of 85, 90 percent. 
When the nodes are involved, it drops significantly, to slightly under 50 percent and the 
more lymph nodes that are involved, the higher the probabilities are that we're dealing 
with systemic disease/3 Scale, at 1366, n.6. Plaintiffs situation is not different from 
Ms. Seale's in any material respect. 
The "actual" injuries alleged by Mrs. Medved are legally no different in nature than 
those actual injuries suffered by Ms. Seale. Both women presented evidence that they had 
undergone more extensive surgery and/or therapy than they would have had if the cancer 
had been diagnosed earlier by the defendants5 physician. 
In Seale, the very same argument now made by Mrs. Medved was, in fact, 
presented to the Utah Supreme Court and rejected. Dr. Gowans argued in his Petition for 
Rehearing that the record demonstrated that Ms. Seale had not only knowledge of injury 
in the form of an increased risk of recurrence of cancer, but she also had knowledge of 
"actual present damage" in the form of past radiation and hormone therapy - "additional 
treatment that would not have been necessary had the cancer been detected earlier." See 
Petition pp. 2-7, attached hereto as Ex. €CA'\ See Order, attached hereto as Ex. "B". The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, denying the Petition For Rehearing on October 2, 
1996. The Utah Supreme Court plainly did not consider such damages sufficient to 
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support a claim in a case for failed or delayed diagnosis of cancer. This is because of the 
basic policy premise of the Seale opinion. 
Because there is no question that the same argument and facts were presented to 
the Supreme Court in Seale, this Court is constrained to follow the controlling law and 
outcome in that case. It is plainly the most recent controlling law direcdy on the issue 
before this Court. 
POINT m 
SEALE REQUIRES THAT ALL PIAINTTFPS 
CLAIMS ARE PRESERVED AND MAY BE 
ASSERTED ONLY AT SUCH TIME AS THERE IS A 
RECURRENCE OF CANCER. 
The essence of plaintiffs argument is that Seale suggests that the one action rule 
allows, her to maintain her claim for damages based on enhanced risk of future cancer as 
long as she can identify any type of present injury such as having received more extensive 
treatment. This argument turns Seale on its head, again ignoring both the underlying facts 
in Seale and the basic premise of the Courts opinion. 
The Supreme Court in Seale did state that the one action rule precludes splitting 
causes of action and the filing of multiple lawsuits arising out of the same alleged wrongful 
act. What plaintiff misses is the fact that the Court made a policy-based decision that the 
one action rule should be applied to avoid the assertion of speculative claims and to 
preserve all claims until such time as there is a recurrence of cancer. Only by such a ruling 
could the Court assure that plaintiffs would not be forced to file premature lawsuits on the 
chance of a recurrence of cancer, while still protecting plaintiffs from the argument that 
awareness of speculative or minor injury would start the statute running and preclude a 
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later claim when the recurrence manifested in real and substantial injury The Court 
noted: 
[M]any of these plaintiffs will be unable to produce the 
necessary evidence to show that the future harm is more likely 
to occur than not. Yet, if the harm, such as the recurrence of 
cancer, later occurs, the plaintiff would be precluded from any 
recovery for devastating injuries by reason of having acquired 
an earlier claim for purely speculative ones. We believe that 
the better approach is to wait until the potential harm 
manifests itself, allowing for more certain proof and fewer 
speculative lawsuits, 
Seale. at 1366. 
Seale poses problems for both plaintiffs and defendants in cancer diagnosis cases. A 
plaintiff might argue that it is unfair to prevent her from a present recovery of existing 
damages for having undergone more extensive surgery or cancer treatment. She is, 
however, insulated from the running of the statute of limitations and assured that she will 
not be without a remedy if the worst (recurrence of the cancer) occurs in the future. In 
short, premature and relatively minor damage cases are precluded (or delayed) in favor of 
preserving full rights to a remedy for the devastating and non-speculative damage cases. 
A defendant physician might argue that the effect of Seale is unfair because it prevents the 
running of the statute of limitations indefinitely, even where the plaintiff is aware Of a 
misdiagnosis. The physician, however, is protected by Seale from speculative claims and 
multiple lawsuits arising from the Same treatment. The Utah Supreme Court balanced 
these different interests Seale and made a sound decision that there shall be only one cause 
of action in these cases and it will not accrue until such time as there is a recurrence of the 
cancer. Plaintiff may not like this outcome now, but it affords her future protection in the 
event the worst happens, and it is the controlling law in this State. 
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Plaintiff mistakenly relies on Swain v. Curry, 595 So.2d 168 (Ha. 1992). The 
defendants, who did not prevail in Seaie, also cited Swain in support of their argument. 
The Supreme Court, expressly declined to follow Swain and rejected defendants5 argument. 
Swain was distinguishable not only oil the facts, but also on the law. An important 
consideration in Swain was the Florida statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
claims, which commences to run when a patient knows of either a breach of the standard 
of care or a physical injury. Swain, at 171 and n.4. Thus, in Swain the Florida court had 
to be concerned with the possibility of the statute of limitations running to preclude a 
misdiagnosis case even where there was no injury.1 The Court solved the problem by 
allowing the patient to proceed with a claim for possible recurrence of cancer. In Utah, 
the state Supreme Court is faced with a different statute of limitations standard which 
requires knowledge of both the physical injury and the possibility that it was caused by 
medical negligence before the statute will commence to run,2 The Utah Supreme Court 
has thus been able to protect plaintiffs in delayed diagnosis of cancer cases by ruling that, 
until there is a recurrence, there is no injury and the statute will not run. 
Most importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the problem of the 
statute of limitations and the one action rule in a way that provides far more protection to 
1
 In Seale. the Court also took note of another Florida case, Tohnson v. Mullee. 385 
So.2d 1038 (Fla. 1980). In that case, however, the Florida Court of Appeal found under similar 
circumstances that the plaintiff had no cause of action until there was a recurrence or metastatic 
spread of the cancer. Notably, Tohnson was decided under an earlier version of Florida's statute of 
limitations, one which was different from that considered in Swain. 
2
 In Utah, the two-year period for bringing a medical negligence claim "does not start to 
run until the injured person knew or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that 
the injury was caused by negligence." Seale. at 1363 (citing Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144,148 
(Utah 1979).) 
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plaintiflFs who ultimately suffer a recurrence, than the Florida Court did in Swain. Rather 
than forcing plaintiffs into premature speculative lawsuits, losing the right to file an action 
upon discovery of the ultimate injury, the Utah Supreme Court has, under its statute of 
limitations, extended to plaintiffs the opportunity in every such case to wait and obtain full 
compensation for the ultimate devastating injury. Seale v. Gowans is the controlling law 
in this case and, as noted above, the facts are indistinguishable. Only one claim may be 
brought for injuries arising from the alleged the delayed diagnosis of cancer, and regardless 
of the existence of some actual injury in the form of more extensive therapy, the claim 
cannot be brought until such time as there is a recurrence of cancer. In the meantime, the 
plaintiff is protected, for the statute of limitations will not run. 
CONCLUSION 
Fortunately, Mrs. Medved has been in remission since completion of her therapy. 
Although there is a statistical possibility or even probability of recurrence, that is 
insufficient to sustain a claim. Plaintiff has failed to present any admissible evidence of a 
legally cognizable present injury under Seale. 
If this Court grants defendants5 motion to dismiss for the reason that no actionable 
claim presently exists, plaintiff will have lost little. If she does suffer a future recurrence, 
she will retain the right to file a claim for full recovery at that time. Only if this Court 
declines to follow Seale by refusing to grant a motion to dismiss, will plaintiff lose the 
right to file a claim if her cancer ever recurs. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their 
motion to dismiss. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff-Appellant Beyerly Seale ("Ms. Seale") commenced this action 
alleging medical negligence on the part of Don F. Gowans ("Dr. Gowans") foi failure to 
detect Ms. Seale's breast cancer approximately one year prior to its diagnosis in May 1988. 
The trial court denied Dr. Gowans' Motion for Summary Judgment on his statute of 
limitation defense on grounds mat it was aquestion of fact for the jury as to when the statute 
of limitation began to run. The jury concluded the statute of limitation began to run in June, 
1988, thus rendering Ms. Seale's action time barred—it not having been commenced until 
more than two years after June, 1988. 
Ms. Seale appealed me trial court's denial of her Motion for JNOV. On 
August 2,1996, mis Court filed its opinion reversing the denial of Ms. Seale's Motion for 
JNOV on grounds mat mere was insufficient evidence to uphold the jury's verdict. Ssatex. 
Gonans, No. 940599, slip op. (Utah, filed August 2,1996). (A copy of the Court's August 
2,1996 opinion is attached hereto as Addendum A,) 
ISSUE ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Dr. Gowans seeks rehearing on the Court's conclusion that defendants 
presented no evidence mat in June, 1988 Ms. Seale could complain of actual present damage 
necessary to trigger the running of me statute of limitation. Grounds for the petition are mat 
substantial evidence in me record establishes mat in June, 1988 Ms. Seale knew or should 
have known that the spread of her cancer to her lymphatic system and its "spreading" or 
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"invasive" character in the breast caused additional treatment that would not have been 
necessary bad the cancer been detected earlier.' (The pages from the Trial Transcript 
comainingthis evidence are attached as Addendum B.) 
ARGUMENT 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
THAT MS. SEALE KNEW OF SHOULD HAVE KNOWN 
IN JUNE 1988 THAT DR. GOWANS' ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE 
CAUSED DAMAGE IN THE FORM OF ADDITIONAL 
MEDICAL TREATMENT 
A. Factual Background 
In August, 1987. Ms. Seale had a mammogram done at Holy Cross Hospital 
Breast Care Center ("Holy Cross") which was interpreted as normal by Dr. Gowans. In 
May, 1988, Ms. Seale had another mammogram done at Holy Cross which was interpreted 
as being suspicious of cancer. That same day, a needle biopsy confirmed that Ms. Seale had 
breast cancer. 
On June 1,1988, Ms. Seale underwent surgery which included the removal of 
breast tissue and lymph node tissue under the arm. The pathology report on tissue submitted 
for analysis following surgery showed the cancer had spread throughout the breast and away 
from me breast to the lymphatic system. A second tumor was also diagnosed which had not 
been previously detected. As a consequence of the delayed diagnosis of her cancer, its 
-Dr. Gowans does not seek rehearing on the Court's legal conclusion mat damages 
in the form of enhanced risk only are insufficient to start the running of the statute of 
limitation. 
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"spreading" or "invasive*' character in me breast and the spread to the lymphatic system. Ms. 
Seale was required to undergo additional treatment-radiation therapy and hormonal therapy. 
This constitutes damage. 
Dr. Gowans claimed, and the-jury concluded, that by June. 1988. Ms. Seale 
knew or should have known of Dr. Gowans' alleged negligent failure to diagnose her cancer 
and that this delay caused her damage-triggering the running of the statute of limitation. 
On appeal mis Court found mere was sufficient evidence to show that in 1988 
Ms. Seale knew or should have known that Dr. Gowans had negligently failed to diagnose 
her cancer in 1987 and that in 1988 Ms. Seale knew her cancer had spread to her lymph 
nodes. The court found also mat the spread of Ms. Scale's cancer decreased the chance of 
her survival and increased the probability the cancer had spread to other areas of her body. 
Scale v, Gowans, No. 940599, slip op at 2,5-7. The record is replete with evidence that by 
June 1988 Ms. Seale was aware of all mis information. (R. 1052-1054,1069-1070,1090, 
1097-1098,1106,1061-1063,1086-1087,1090.) 
However, the Court held mat the fact that the spread of Ms. Seale's cancer 
decreased her chance of survival to below 50 percent and increased ihe probability the cancer 
had spread to other areas of the body did not constitute a legally cognizable injury to trigger 
the running of the statute of limitation. The rale adopted by me Court is that without proof 
of actual damages, a claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a cause of action for 
negligence.. Seale v. Gowans. No. 940599, slip op at 7. The Court made dear, however, that 
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"once some harm is manifest, the limitations period begins to ran on all claims, present and 
future/* Id. at 6. 
In concluding there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, the 
Court found that defendants failed to produce evidence that Ms. Seale suffered any actual 
present damage because of the cancer's spread to her lymphatic system. Rowans v. £gak. 
No. 940599, slip op at 6-7. However, there is substantial evidence in the record that Ms. 
Seale suffered actual present damages in June, 1988. Plaintiif had the obligation to marshall 
this evidence and failed to do so. Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). The 
evidence is that in June, 1988, Ms. Seale knew or should have known that her cancer had an 
"invasive" or "spreading'" nature in the breast and had spread to her lymphatic system and 
that because of this, she would need additional and more extensive treatment than would 
have been necessary bad the cancer been diagnosed before the spread. 
Set forth below is the substantial evidence supporting the verdict that Ms, Seale 
knew or should have known in June, 1988 that she suffered actual present damage,. 
-A possible explanation for the Court overlooking the evidence that by June, 1988, 
Ms. Seale had suffered actual damage is the Court's apparent belief that "[defendants"' 
contend that the evidence produced at trial shows that in May, 1988, Ms. Seale had 
discovered or should have discovered both Dr. Gowans' negligence in failing to detect 
her cancer and the injury that resulted from that negligence." Seale v Gowans at 5. 
However, it has never been Dr. Gowans' contention that in May, 1988 Seale had 
discovered injury resulting from negligence. Dr. Gowans has always aTSMed that bv June. 
1988. aftfTfhe diagnosis of the spread of Ms. Seale's cancer yp her lymphatic system, and 
tfa cancer's mvasive nature, which necessitated additional treatment, Ms. Seale knew or 
should have known of her legal injury. 
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Dr. Hogle testified that the type and scope of treatment to be employed in 
treating breast cancer depends upon whether the cancer is localized to the breast regional** 
involved in the breast and lymph nodes, or systemic-meaning the cancer has gone beyond 
the breast and lymph nodes to the bones, lungs, or someplace else in the body. (R. 1048-
1049,1074-10750. Dr. Hogle met with Ms. Seale on two occasions between May 27,1988 
and June 1, 1988 and discussed with her the biology of breast cancer and the treatment 
options usedto treat it, (R. 1050-10590 Ms. Seale testified that she knew as early as 1985 
that delay in diagnosis of cancer had an effect on the treatment of cancer, (R. 12290 
Dr. Hogle testified there are two different sets of treatment. The first set is 
what is refored to as "primary" therapy and involves a choice between two surgical 
procedures: (1) lumpectomy, called breast conservation therapy, or (2) modified radical 
mastectomy. Where, however, cancer is no longer localized, that is, has spread to the lymph 
nodes, fhpn "secondary" treatment, frequently refened to as "adjuvant therapy* is necessary. 
Adjuvant therapy includes chemotherapy or hormonal treatments and on occasion radiation 
therapy in addition to the mastectomy.3 The adjuvant therapy becomes necessary because 
the spread to the lymphatic System creates a significant probability the cancer has spread to 
other areas of the body. (R. 1048-1049. 1061-1063,1O86408Z) 
In June, 1988, following surgery, Dr. Hogle told Ms. Seale her cancer had 
spread beyond the breast and into the lymphatic system and that the spread significantly 
*~*-******mmmmm^mmmm^mmmmtmmmmmmmmmwarnmmmmm 
'Radiation therapy is usually employed as part of the lumpectomy or breast 
conservation primary therapy. 
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reduced her prognosis for a successful cure and increased the likelihood the cancer had 
spread to omer areas of the body. (R- 106M063,1086-1087.1090.) Dr. Hogle testified that 
the finding in June, 1988 of the spread of Ms. Seale's cancer to her lymphatic system and 
its invasive nature caused the need for additional treatment-adjuvant thcrapy-and that in 
June, 1988, he informed Ms. Seale of mis fact and recommended additional therapy. Dr. 
Hogle recommended radiation therapy and referred Ms. Seale to Dr, John Thompson' for this 
therapy; also he recommended chemotherapy or hormonal therapy and referred her to Dr. 
James Cecil for this therapy. (R. 1059,1062.1065s 1199-1201.) Dr. Hogle testified: 
0 Did vmi_ because of the findings at ffie time of surgery. 
including the spread to the Ivmnhafic system and the invasive 
nature of the tumof.-make some recommendations to Ms. Seale 
about additional cancer therapy that von felt would he appropri-
ate to consider? 
A Yes.ar, Idid. 
* • # * 
Q ...[You], told her mat findings of the metastasis spread to 
the lymph nodes and of the invasive nature of the cancer within 
the breast itself? 
A Yes, that it triggered the need for additional Treatment, 
(emphasis added) 
(R. 1063-1064.) Consequently, Ms. Seale underwent daily radiation treatment for five to 
seven weeks and underwent hormonal therapy-the taking of tamoxifen at least once per day 
for more man three years. (R, 11 KM 112» 120M203.) 
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Accordingly, the record establishes that in June. 1988. Ms. Seale knew or 
should haw known: 
(1) matjearly diagnosis of cancer is better than late diagnosis: 
(2) that file delay in diagnosis of cancer increases the probability that cancer 
has spread and that such-delay affects the treatment of cancer; 
(3) that Dr. Gowans failed to diagnose her cancer approximately one year 
before it was diagnosed; 
(4) that by the time me cancer was diagnosed in 1988 it had an "invasive" 
or "spreading" nature in the breast and had spread to her lymphatic system; and 
(5) that because Of the nature of the cancer and its spread she had to 
midCTPO additional and more extensive treatment thaw wonld have been necessary had the 
cancer been diagnosed earlier4 
The additional treatment caused by the spread of Ms. Seale's cancer is actual 
present damage known to Ms. Seale which triggered the running of the statute of limitation 
in June, 1988. 
B. Legal Application of Facts 
The position of Dr. GovTans is supported by the case law cited by the Court in 
its decision. Swain v, Curry, 595 So. 2d 168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1992 V review denied. 601 So. 
2d 5S1 (Ha. 1992); rolhert v. Georgetown Umv.T 641 A. 2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1994) <en banc). 
'The failure of Ms. Seale to "marshal!" this evidence in support of the jury verdict 
is a substantial factor in it being overlooked by the Court in its opinion. 
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The Court incorrectly concluded these cases were distinguishable because the evidence 
therein showed the plaintiffs had suffered actual damage in conjunction with the increased 
risk of the cancer's reoccurrence. In light of the uncontradicted evidence in the record that 
Ms. Seale knew she was required to undergo more treatment than would have been required 
had the cancer been diagnosed before its spread, these cases are directly on point. 
In Swayi v riirryT plaintiffs alleged Dr. Curry failed to detect Swain's breast 
cancer approximately one year before it was diagnosed by another physician. Swain argued 
tne delay in diagnosis caused present damage even though at the time of the opinion Ms. 
Swain had no clinical evidence of recurrence of cancer. Plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the 
delay in diagnosis affected treatment modalities for her cancer and that if the cancer had been 
diagnosed earlier she would not have received chemotherapy and would have undergone a 
lumpectomy with radiation as opposed to a mastectomy. Swain v. Curry. 595 So. 2d at 169-
170. 
In reversing summary judgment in favor of Dr. Curry, the Florida Court of 
Appeals held mat Swain had presented evidence that her treatment and related damages 
would have been different had the cancer been diagnosed earlier. Therefore, Swain had a 
cause of action for additional physical-damages as a result of the claimed delayed diagnosis 
against which the statute of limitation began to run. Id 
In Oribcrt v Georgetown Tfaivr plaintiff alleged defendant physician 
negligently treated Susan Colbert's cancer. The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendant physician holding that Susan 
9 
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Colbert sustained "appreciatable and actual harm" sufficient to trigger the running of the 
statute of limitation when she sustained damages incident to treatment and therapy, such as 
radiation and chemotherapy, allegedly necessary because of the negligent treatment of her 
cancer. CpIbeH-V, GCQTgetOWl Univ., 641 A. 2d at 473-475. 
This Court's conclusion that the evidence showed that Ms. Scale could not 
have discovered any legally cognizable injury until 1991 when she discovered die cancer had 
spread to her hip is incorrect The damage MB. Seale became aware of in 1991 is the same 
damage she was aware of in June, 1988. What Ms. Scale knew in 1991 was that the cancer 
had spread to her hip which required additional radiation therapy and, consequently, damage 
resulted therefrom. What Ms. Seale knew in June, 1988' was that the cancer had an invasive 
component and had spread to her lymphatic system and that consequently she suffered 
damage in die form of radiation and hormonal treatment die would not have had to' undergo 
had the cancer been diagnosed earlier. 
Ms. Seale knew no more about whether the delayed diagnosis of her cancer 
caused her damage in 1991 than she knew in 1988. Dr. Hogle testified there is no way to tell 
precisely when Ms. Seale's cancer spread from her breast and into the vascular system which 
spread manifested itself in her hip in 199L Dr. Hogle stated: 
Q As we sit here today, is there any way to tell precisely in 
Ms. Seale's case when the cancer metastasized or spread from 
her breast into the vascular system and it's now shown up in her 
hip? 
A No. There is not. 
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(R. 1068.) Ms. Seale acknowledged Dr. Hogle informed her that her cancerous tumor had 
been in her body for a mimroum often years. (R. 1227.) The spread of Ms. Seale's cancer 
into her vascular system could have occurred prior to 1987 when Dr. Oowans faHed to detect 
the cancer-there is simply no way to tell precisely when the spread occurred. 
C Statutes of Limitation 
Finally, statutes of limitation are by design indiscriminant in their application 
and often harsh in their result. Whether this is wise or unwise, just or unjust is, admittedly, 
subject to debate~but not within this case. The two year statute of limitation in U.C-A. § 78-
14-4 is the law to be applied. The trial court following case law from mis Court concluded 
that when Ms. Seale knew or should have known of her legal injury was a question of fact. 
After being properly instructed on the applicable law,s the jury having considered this 
evidence (and knowing the legal effect of their verdict) found that Ms. Seale knew or should 
have known of her legal injury in June, 1988. (R. 715; see Special Verdict Form attached 
hereto as Addendum C.) The trial court in denying Ms. Seale's JNOV motion held that 
"there is competent evidence sufficient to support the verdict" (R. 830-831.) Substantial 
and uncontradicted evidence supports this verdict and it should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has overlooked die substantial and uncontradicted evidence which 
establishes mat in June, 1988, Ms. Seale was aware of Dr. Gowans* alleged negligence and 
'Scale v frowns No. 940599, slip op at 4n5. 
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that this conduct caused her actual damage in the form of additional medical treatment in 
addition to the increased risk of future harm. 
The Petition for Rehearing should be granted, 
RULE 35(a) CERTIFICATION 
Counsel for Petitioner, J. Anthony Eyre and Kirk G. Gibbs, certify that this 
Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
DATED THIS 1 6 ^ day of August. 1996. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
L K X J ^ 
[QNYEYRE, 
G. GIBBS, ESQ.I-
Attorneys for Appellee^ 
Don F. Gowans, M.D. 
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DON F. GOWANS, M.D., and 
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL, doing 
business as HOLY CROSS BREAST 




(Demand for Jury Trial) 
civn NO. f/tffjyty? /i 
HonJUDGE RICHARD H. UCrrnf 
Plaintiff complains of defendants as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. At all relevant times, defendant Don F. Gowans, M.D. 
("Dr. Gowans") was a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, and was 
duly licensed to practice medicine under the laws of Utah. 
3. At all relevant times defendant Holy Cross Hospital 
doing business as Holy Cross Breast Center and Holy Cross Breast 
Care Services is a Utah healthcare corporation engaged in the 
business of providing medical care and treatment. 
«> a A i» r« v 
4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code § 78-3-4 (1988). The controverted amount exceeds 
$10,000.00, exclusive of attorneys' fees and costs. 
5. This Court has personal jurisdiction and venue. The 
parties reside in Salt Lake County and the acts of defendants in 
this lawsuit occurred in Salt Lake County. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
6. Beginning in 1985 and continuing through 1991, 
plaintiff was under the care of Holy Care Breast Care Center, now 
known as Holy Cross Breast Care Services and, among others 
physicians, Dr. Gowans. As such, Holy Cross and Dr. Gowans owed a 
duty of care to the plaintiff to diagnose and report disease, 
including cancer, of plaintiff's breasts. 
7. On May 27, 1988, Holy Cross diagnosed plaintiff as 
having cancer of her left breast. 
8. Defendants breached their duty of care to the 
plaintiff from August 12, 1987 through May 27, 1988, by failing to 
diagnose plaintiff's breast cancer. 
9. Defendants failure to promptly diagnose plaintiff's 
breast cancer has directly and proximately caused plaintiff's 
outcome from the cancer to be less favorable and her likelihood of 
recovery from the cancer less likely, all causing plaintiff special 
and general damages in amounts to be established at trial. 
o o o ' ) o;, 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment in her favor and 
against the defendants for special and general damages; for her 
costs incurred herein and for such additional relief as the Court 
deems appropriate under the circumstances. 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues presented 
by this Complaint pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
DATED this 17th day of December, 1991. 
FfeS R. Silvesterf Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
1614 South 1400 East 
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C. JOSEPH GLENN, M.D. and ESTATE 
OF BLAYNE L. HIRSCHE, M.D., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
DISMISSAL WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 010400960 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 2, 2002, defendants C. Joseph Glenn, M.D. and Blayne L. Hirsche. M.D. 
filed Defendants' Joint Motion for Dismissal Without Prejudice with a Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Dismissal Without 
Prejudice. 
Plaintiff Jamie Medved filed Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Joint Motion for 
Dismissal Without Prejudice on August 14, 2002. 
Defendants filed their Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Dismissal Without Prejudice on September 13, 2002. 
On September 24, 2002, defendants filed a Notice to Submit and a Request for Oral 
Argument. 
On November 20, 2002, oral arguments were heard by the Court. 
The Court took the matter under advisement at that time. 
On November 26, 2002, the Court was informed by an article in the Provo Daily 
Herald that Dr. Blayne L. Hirsche and his wife were killed in a plane accident. The Court 
informed the parties that any claim against Dr. Hirsche would have to be filed against his 
estate. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Substitution pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure was filed on December 10, 2002. The Motion requested that the Estate of 
Blayne L. Hirsche be substituted in the place and stead of Dr. Blayne L. Hirsche. The Court 
has now executed an Order substituting "The Estate of Blayne L. Hirsche" as defendant. 
FACTS 
The following facts are admitted by the parties or not in material dispute: 
1. Plaintiff first saw Dr. Glenn as a patient in 1991. 
2. Plaintiffs last visit with Dr. Glenn was February 27, 1998. 
3. During the time plaintiff was Dr. Glenn's patient, she was diagnosed with 
fibrocystic breast disease. 
4. Plaintiff first saw Dr. Hirsche as a patient on July 13, 1998. 
5. A mammogram, ordered by Dr. Hirsche and performed on July 20, 1998, 
revealed dense fibroglandular tissue bilaterally. 
6. On August 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed bilateral breast augmentation and 
aspiration of three suspected right breast cysts. 
7. On December 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche performed an excisional biopsy of three 
right breast nodules. 
8. The pathological examination associated with the December 12, 1998, 
excisional biopsy revealed the presence of differentiated infiltrating ductal carcinoma. 
9. On December 28, 1998, Steven J. Mintz, M.D. performed a right modified 
radical mastectomy. 
10. Plaintiff followed her surgical treatment with chemotherapy and radiation 
therapy and later had surgical reconstruction. 
11. Plaintiff has not had a recurrence of her cancer. 
ANALYSIS 
Pursuant to Rule 52(a), the Court provides the following statement of the grounds for 
its decision. 
In their Motion for Dismissal Without Prejudice, defendants assert that plaintiff fails 
to establish a legally recognizable claim. They assert that Utah law does not recognize a 
cause of action for loss of chance or enhanced risk. In citing Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 
1361 (Utah 1996), defendants claim that plaintiff does not have a cause of action until she 
has shown actual harm and not simply an increased risk of harm. In this case, such actual 
harm would be evident in the recurrence of cancer. Defendants contend that because plaintiff 
has not suffered a recurrence of cancer, she cannot claim damages. 
Plaintiff responds to these arguments by asserting that Utah law has recognized that 
liability may be imposed where negligence increases a party's risk of harm. George v, LPS 
Hospital, 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1990). Plaintiff further asserts she sustained actual 
damages in addition to facing a greater risk of cancer recurrence. Namely, plaintiff asserts 
that due to defendants' negligent diagnosis, she underwent more extensive treatment and 
surgery including a radical mastectomy. Accordingly, plaintiff claims she has met the 
requirement of actual injury found in Seale v. Go wans. 
In analyzing the claims of each of the parties, the Court finds itself in a difficult 
position. The Court is sympathetic to plaintiffs claims and is reluctant to limit her potential 
remedies. However, the Court is convinced that overly speculative claims are not allowed 
under Utah law. The Court finds Utah law has only recognized liability based on increased 
risk in narrow circumstances where the increased risk can be analyzed in the context of an 
injury related to the risk alleged. 
For instance, in George v. LPS Hospital the Utah Court of Appeals examined a case 
where attending nurses failed to inform treating physicians of a patient's failing health. After 
the patient's health slipped for some time, the physicians were notified of the situation. 
Shortly thereafter, the patient died. The plaintiff in George asserted that as a result of the 
nurses' actions, the physicians were unable to perform various treatments that may have 
improved the patient's health. In the context of this set of facts, the Court of Appeals stated, 
"[e]vidence which shows a reasonable certainty that negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment 
increased the need for or lessened the effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to establish 
proximate cause." Id at 1121 (quoting James v. United States, 483 F.Supp. 581, 585 
(N.D.C.A. 1980). 
This Court notes that in George, the finder of fact could determine issues of causation 
and damages in the context of an actual injury related to the increased risk. In other words, 
the risk of not recovering could be measured from the perspective that the patient had indeed 
died. The cases from other jurisdictions cited in George also involved an increased risk 
analysis in the context of an injury related to the risk alleged. For example, in Hicks v. 
United States, 368 F.2d 626 <4th Cir. 1966) and Goff v. Doctors General Hospital of San 
Jose, 333 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1958) the patient at issue in the malpractice action had died. 
Seale v. Go wans reaffirms this understanding of the law. In Seale, the plaintiff 
claimed that a late diagnosis of breast cancer placed her at an increased risk of cancer. The 
main issue presented in Seale involved the application of the statute of limitations. The 
defendants asserted that the statute of limitations started to run in 1988 when Ms. Seale 
discovered that cancer had spread to her lymph nodes—an indication that Ms. Seale's chances 
of disease free survival were dramatically reduced. The Court disagreed. The Court found 
the statute of limitations began to run in 1991 when Ms. Seale discovered cancer had spread 
to her hip despite her mastectomy and other remedial measures. In explaining this decision, 
the Seale Court discussed the dangers of a scheme which would force a plaintiff to file a 
complaint asserting possible or probable future harm in order to avoid the running of the 
statute of limitations. The Court stated: 
[P]laintiffs who are not exhibiting any actual, physical harm . . . 
would be forced to bring an action for injuries that may or may 
not occur in the future. However, many of these plaintiffs will 
be unable to produce the necessary evidence to show that the 
future harm is more likely to occur than not. Yet if the harm, 
such as the recurrence of cancer, actually later occurs, the 
plaintiff would be precluded from any recovery for devastating 
injuries by reason of having acquired an earlier claim for purely 
speculative ones. We believe that the better approach is to wait 
until the potential harm manifests itself, allowing for more 
certain proof and fewer speculative lawsuits. 
Id. at 1366 
In the present case, the plaintiff has claimed an increased risk of cancer recurrence. 
She has not, however, claimed the injury related to that increased risk—the actual recurrence 
of cancer. Instead, plaintiff has claimed that she had to undergo more extensive treatment. 
The Court is unconvinced this injury is sufficiently related to the risk alleged. It appears to 
be an independent result of the alleged malpractice. The injury in no way helps the court 
identify issues of causation or damages associated with the increased risk. Nor does the 
injury help curtail speculation as to some yet unrealized harm. 
The lack of an injury clearly related to the increased risk is very problematic and 
troubling to the Court. On the most practical level, the Court cannot conceive how jury 
instructions for damages on the claim could be presented without asking jurors to speculate 
on what may or may not occur in the future. Such broad speculation has not been approved 
by Utah courts. 
Utah law has not recognized claims of increased risk in the absence of a related 
injury. Plaintiff has claimed an increased risk of cancer recurrence, but has not claimed an 
injury clearly related to that risk. Accordingly, the Court finds no legally recognized claim 
and hereby ORDERS that plaintiffs legal action and claims against defendants be and the 
same are hereby dismissed without prejudice. Each of the parties shall bear her, tiis or its 
respective costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this / ^ day of March, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
%Z&?0i 
W. Davis 
Approved as to Form: 
Anne D. Armstrong 
Counsel for Defendant C. Joseph Glenn, M.D. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Beverly Purswell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law offices of 
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Estate of Blayne L. Hirsche, M.D., defendant herein; that 
she served tht proposed attached ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE in Civil No. 010400960 before the 
Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, upon die parties listed 
below by placing a true and correct copy diereof in an envelope addressed to: 
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Michael F. Richman 
James W Gilson 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5664 S. Green Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
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Curtis J. Drake 
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March, 2003. 
Beverly Purswqg) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 13th day of March, 2003. 
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